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Summary in english

ID-porten offer authentication services from Norwegian citizens towards service providers in the Norwegian public sector. Most services should use the authorization code flow as standardized by OpenID Connect for integration towards ID-porten.

This english summary is intentionally kept very brief. We advice english speaking companies to study the OpenID Connect specification for details. ID-porten implements a subset of this specification, conforming more-or-less to a basic OpenID Provider.

The authorization code flow is recommended from almost all services which integrates towards ID-porten.

The integration activity is started by sending an email to “idporten (at) Digitaliseringsdirektoratet (dot) no”.

Overall description

graph LR end_user(User) OP(ID-porten) RP(Relying party / service provider) end_user -. authenticates towards .-> OP OP -. issues id_token .-> RP end_user -. logging into .-> RP

Følgende aktører inngår:

Party Description Term in OIDC
User Wants to log in to a public service End User
Service Web-based service offered by a Norwegian public body Relying Party (RP) / Client
ID-porten The authentication service offered by ID-porten OpenID Provider (OP)

Authorization code flow:

sequenceDiagram User ->> Relying Party: Clicks "login"-button Relying Party ->> User: Redirect with authentication request User ->> OpenID Provider: follow redirect... note over User,OpenID Provider: End user authenticates himself (opt. consents to scopes) OpenID Provider ->> User: Redirect with authorization code User ->> Relying Party: follow redirect... Relying Party ->> OpenID Provider: request token (/token) OpenID Provider ->> Relying Party: id_token (opt. other tokens) note over User,Relying Party: User is logged in to the service

See the description in OIDC Core for details.

It is of utmost importance that the client performs all validations steps described in the specification.

Some relevant paramteres in the authentication request:

Parameter Comment
response_type Only code is supported by ID-porten
client_id ID-porten will provide you with a client-id
redirect_uri The end user will be redirected here after a successful authentication. Only pre-registered URIs can be used.
scope Whitespace-separated list of requested scopes. Normally just “openid”.
state Value set by the client and returned in the callback. Recommended to user to implement CSRF-protection.
nonce Value set by the client and returned in the id-token. Recommended to use to protect from replay attacks.
acr_values Requested security level, either idporten-loa-substantial or idporten-loa-high
ui_locales Requested language in the user interface, we support nb, nn, en or se
prompt Optional, used to govern end user involvement. Only login is supported by ID-porten

Session handling

Please note that ID-porten and the Relying party holds individual http sessions. It is the responsibility of the relying party to transform the id_token into a local session suitable for their service.

The ID-porten session is used to offer single signon (SSO) between all federations members. A Relying party may override SSO by using prompt=login in the authentication request, however the SSO session is still created in ID-porten, and the user is vulnerable to SSO towards subsequent relying parties.

Session lifetime in ID-porten is as follows:

  • inactivity time: 30 minutes
  • maximium lifetime: 120 minutes

Composite services that rely on SSO to offer a seamless end user journey between individual services, must make sure to refresh the session before the inactivity time expires.

Note that the ‘exp’-claim in the id_token is not related to the http session.


Relying parties must offer single logout functionality from their own service, by sending an /endsession-call according to OIDC Session Management specification. Post-logout redirect URIs must be preregistered on the client in ID-porten.

In addition, Relying parties must also be able to handle logout request from ID-porten conforming to the OIDC Front Channel Logout specification. A front-channel logout URI must be preregistered on the client in ID-porten.

Client authentication at the token endpoint

The use of the token endpoint differ somewhat depending on which client authentication method is being used. The following authentication methods from OIDC chapter 9 is supported:

Using static client secret

A static symmetric key (client_secret) must be obtained from Digitaliseringsdirektoratet. Production secrets will not be handed over by email. The relying party is responsible for rotating the secret before it expires at ID-porten.

The client auth is performed by adding a standard HTTP Basic authentication header. (base64-encoded concatenated string by client_id, a colon and the client_secret).

This method is in general not recommended for sensitive services, and Digdir recommends going for private_key_jwt instead.


POST /token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic dGVzdF9ycF95dDI6cGFzc3dvcmQ=


Using JWT token

This is the recommended method for client authentication.

The client must generate a JWT token having claims as defined in the private_key_jwt-section in chapter 9 of the OIDC-spesifikasjonen, and sign this using a valid X.509 Norwegian business certificate (“virksomhetssertifikat”).

The following claims in the JWT is of interest:

Claim Comment
aud Audience - the identifier for ID-porten. See the issuer claim at the well-known-endpoint for correct value.
iss issuer - your client ID
sub subject - your client ID
iat issued at - timestamp when this jwt was generated. NOTE: UTC-time.
exp expiration time - timestamp when this jwt expire. NOTE: UTC-tid. Max allowable lifespan is 120 seconds (exp - iat <= 120)
jti Optional - JWT ID - unique id for this JWT. A JWT can not be reused

The following header claims in the JWT should be noted:

Claim Comment
x5c The certificate used for signing the JWT.
alg RS256, RS384 or RS512.


POST /token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

   client_assertion=< jwt >


The relying party must validate the id-token according to https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDTokenValidation

The following claims in the id-token should be noted:


claim Comment
kid “Key identifier” - unique identifier for the signature. Key and cerificate must be fetched from the well-known endpoint.
alg “algorithm” - signing algorithm, RS256, RS384, RS512 are supported


claim verdi
sub “subject identifier” - unique identifier for the end user. A pairwise value, meaning that a client will always get the same value for the same user, but different clients get different values.
aud “audience” - your client_id
acr “Authentication Context Class Reference” - The security level used. Possible values are “idporten-loa-substantial” (ie. MinID) or “idporten-loa-high”. This must be verified by the relying party.
amr “Authentication Methods References” - Possible values Minid-PIN, Minid-OTC, Commfides, Buypass, eIDAS, BankID or BankID-mobil, this may change over time.
iss The identifier of ID-porten
pid Personidentifikator - Proprietary claim, for the Norwegian national identifier (“F-number” or “D-number”)
exp Expire - A client must not accept the id-token after this timestamp.
locale The language used by the end user during the authentication process.
iat Timestamp when this token is issued
jti jwt id - unique identifier for this token
sid sesjonsid - a unique identifier the session for this end user. Should be kept by the client to aid single logout


By requesting the profile scope in the authentication request, an access_token for the userinfo-endpoint will be included in the response.

Please note that our userinfo endpoint does not contain any claims of value, and is solely offered in order to be compliant to the OIDC specification. ID-porten does not know the name or other profile details for the end users.